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This report includes some initial thoughts on how to use transformation based linear 
programming approach to solve economic dispatch problems in competitive electricity 
markets, in order to disguise critical financial data of individual market participants and  
physical information of the electricity grid from being disclosed publically, especially 
when system operators are relying more and more on cloud computing services to 
perform critical and time-consuming power system optimization tasks. 
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work on using the transformation based linear programming approach to solve other 
critical power system operation problems has been presented in another manuscript that is 
under review by IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid. 
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 
Abstract— With the emerging of smart grid techniques, cyber 
attackers may be able to gain access to critical energy 
infrastructure data and strategic market participants may be able 
to identify their rival producers’ offer prices. This paper discusses 
a privacy-preserving economic dispatch (ED) approach in 
competitive electricity market, in which individual generation 
companies (GENCOs) and load serving entities (LSEs) can mask 
their actual bidding information and physical data by multiplying 
with random numbers before submitting to Independent System 
Operators (ISOs)/Regional Transmission Owners (RTOs). This 
would avoid potential information leakage of critical energy 
infrastructure and financial data of market participants. The 
optimal solution to the original ED problem, including optimal 
dispatches of generators/loads and locational marginal prices 
(LMPs), can be retrieved from the optimal solution of the proposed 
privacy-preserving ED approach. Numerical case studies show the 
effectiveness of the proposed approach for protecting private 
information of individual market participants while guaranteeing 
the same optimal ED solution. Computation and communication 
costs of the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach and the 
original ED are also compared in case studies. 
Index Terms—Economic dispatch, LMP, privacy-preserving. 
NOMENCLATURE 
Variables: 
a, b Indices of buses 
𝐷𝑣𝑘𝑡  Dispatch of load v at segment k of hour t 
𝑖, 𝑗 Index of GENCOs/LSEs 
k, l, t Index of segments/lines/time periods 
𝑃𝑢𝑘𝑡    Dispatch of unit u at segment k of hour t 
𝑢, 𝑣 Index of generators/loads 
𝜃𝑎𝑡 , 𝜃𝑏𝑡 Bus angles of buses a and b at hour t 
Constants: 
𝐵, 𝐿, 𝑇 Number of buses/lines/time periods 
c𝑢𝑘   Bidding price of generator u at segment k 
d𝑣𝑘    Bidding price of load v at segment k 
𝐷𝑣𝑘, ?̅?𝑣𝑘 Min/max bidding quantity of load v at segment k 
𝐺, 𝐷 Number of GENCOs/LSEs 
𝑚𝑖(𝑗)/𝑛𝑖(𝑗) Numbers of constraints/variables related to GENCO 
i (LSE j) 
𝑃𝑢𝑘, ?̅?𝑢𝑘 Min/max bidding quantity of unit u at segment k 
𝑃𝑢
𝑑𝑛, 𝑃𝑢
𝑢𝑝
 Ramping down/up limits of unit u 
𝑃𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑙 Capacity of line l 
𝑥𝑎𝑏  Reactance of a line that connects buses a and b 
Vectors and Matrices: 
𝐁𝑏 Row of nodal admittance matrix related to bus b 
𝐁, 𝛉 Nodal admittance matrix and bus angle vector 
𝐜𝑖, 𝐝𝑗 Vector of bidding prices for GENCO i/LSE j 
𝐃𝑗   Dispatch vector of loads in LSE j 
𝐄𝑖 , 𝐌𝑖  Constraint coefficients of GENCO i 
𝐅𝑗 , 𝐍𝑗 Constraint coefficients of LSE j 
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𝑮 Branch susceptance matrix 
𝑲𝑳 Branch-bus incidence matrix  
𝑲𝐏𝑖 Bus-generation incidence matrix of GENCO i 
𝐊𝐃𝑗 Bus-load incidence matrix of LSE j 
𝐏𝑖    Dispatch vector of generators in GENCO i 
𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅  Vector of line capacity limits 
𝐑𝑙1 , 𝐑𝑙2. (𝑇 ∙ 𝐿) × (𝑇 ∙ 𝐿) random positive diagonal matrices 
generated by ISO 
𝐑𝐃𝑗, 𝐑𝐆𝑖 An 𝑚𝑗 × 𝑚𝑗 / 𝑚𝑖 × 𝑚𝑖  random positive diagonal 
matrix generated by LSE j /GENCO i 
𝐗𝑙1, 𝐗𝑙2 (𝑇 ∙ 𝐿) × (𝑇 ∙ 𝐿) random positive matrices generated 
by ISO 
𝐗𝑏   An (𝑇 ∙ 𝐵) × (𝑇 ∙ 𝐵)  random positive matrix 
generated by ISO 
𝐗𝐃𝑗, 𝐗𝐆𝑖  An 𝑚𝑗 × 𝑚𝑗 /𝑚𝑖 × 𝑚𝑖  random matrix generated by 
LSE j/ GENCO i 
𝐘𝐃𝑗 , 𝐘𝐆𝑖 An 𝑛𝑗 × 𝑛𝑗 / 𝑛𝑖 × 𝑛𝑖  random positive matrix 
generated by LSE j/ GENCO i 
𝐘𝜃 An 𝑛𝐼𝑆𝑂 × 𝑛𝐼𝑆𝑂 random positive matrix generated by 
ISO 
𝛉𝑡 Bus angle vector at hour t 
𝟎 A zero vector or matrix 
’ Transpose of a vector or matrix 
𝛂, 𝛃, 𝛍, 𝛌 Vectors of dual variables 
𝒔?̃?,𝐬?̃?,𝒔?̃? Vectors of slack variables 
I. INTRODUCTION 
N restructured power systems, ISOs/RTOs coordinate 
competitive market participants for ensuring secure system 
operation and economic market operation. Such operation 
decisions are usually made via optimization approaches, such as 
unit commitment (UC) and ED problems. This paper focuses on 
the ED problem, which determines the least-cost operation of 
power systems by dispatching generation resources to supply 
system loads, while satisfying prevailing system-level and unit 
constraints.  
Emerging smart grid techniques have been promoting the 
increasing participation of new entities into power markets, 
including smalls-scale renewable/gas-fired generation owners, 
prosumers equipped with self-owned generation resources, and 
active customers with demand response capabilities. For 
instance, NYISO allows various entities to participate in its 
energy, ancillary service, and demand response markets with the 
minimum asset size of 1MW [1]. The participation of 
small-scale entities would significantly increase the volume of 
data and the scale of optimization models, which boosts the 
request on high-performance efficient computing architectures. 
In turn, ISOs/RTOs have been looking into the solution of cloud 
computing technology for solving their ever increasing 
operation problems [2]. However, such optimization models 
always contain critical energy infrastructure information and 
private financial information of individual market participants, 
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and in turn security concerns area raised when adopting could 
computing. Different security schemes, including identity and 
access management, security group control, and secure data 
transmission, are being explored regarding the appropriate 
information disclosure under cloud computing. 
Under the restructured power market environment, in order to 
solve the ED problem, detailed information of individual market 
participants needs to be collected by the ISO/RTO for the 
centralized optimization. These market participants are 
distributed in the system and tend to autonomously maximize 
their own profits. They share system-level global constraints as 
well as local constraints that refer to its private limitations or 
capacities, and serious privacy problems may arise if such 
information is revealed. Although ISOs/RTOs are neutral and 
have strict policies regarding the release of such information, 
there are at least two potential ways that may lead to information 
leakage: cyberattack and other strategic ways to derive such 
information. Smart grid technology makes the system even 
more vulnerable, and attackers could gain access to critical data 
streams via either hacking into the communication 
infrastructure, ISOs/RTOs’ database, or the cloud. Another way 
is that a strategic market participant may be able to identifying 
its rival producers’ offer prices with limited available 
information. This in turn would result in great loss of possible 
confidential information leakage. For instance, [3] adopted the 
inverse optimization to reveal price offers of rival producers, 
with the assumption that accepted generation/ demand blocks 
for producers/consumers and LMPs are known.  
Over the past few years, various schemes have been explored 
for solving ED problems in a distributed fashion, which does not 
require a subsystem to disclose its confidential financial 
information to other subsystems or ISOs/RTOs. Lagrangian 
Relaxation (LR) was used in [4]-[6] to relax coupling 
constraints among different subsystems and allow subproblems 
to be solved separately. Auxiliary problem principle (APP) was 
applied on the distributed optimal power flow problem [7]-[8], 
which solves a sequence of auxiliary problems involving the 
augmented LR. Alternating direction method of multipliers 
(ADMM) was also utilized for solving distributed convex power 
system optimization problems [9]. Another important method 
applied to distributed optimization is the consensus algorithm. 
Distributed ED approach based on the incremental cost (IC) 
consensus was discussed in [10]-[11].  
Inspired by [12]-[13], different from distributed optimization, 
this paper proposes a privacy-preserving ED approach which is 
still a centralized problem solved by ISOs/RTOs. Individual 
market participants can mask their actual bidding information 
and physical data by multiplying with random numbers before 
submitting to ISOs/RTOs. It also allows the ISO to encrypt the 
physical transmission network information, which makes it 
possible to rely on cloud computing service providers for 
performing critical and time-consuming power system 
optimization tasks while not worry about critical information 
leakage. In addition, the proposed privacy-preserving ED 
approach can retrieve the optimal solution to the original ED 
problem, including optimal dispatches of generators/loads and 
LMPs. This allows ISOs to continue performing market 
operation functionalities. Numerical case studies validate the 
effectiveness of the proposed approach for protecting private 
information while guaranteeing the same optimal ED solution. 
Computation and communication costs of the proposed 
privacy-preserving ED approach and the original ED are also 
compared in case studies to demonstrate the scalability of the 
proposed approach. Although this paper focuses on the ED 
problem for a single ISO/RTO, the proposed approach can also 
be applied for solving multi-area coordinated ED problems for 
multiple interconnected ISOs/RTOs [14]. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
presents the proposed privacy preserving ED problem approach. 
Numerical case studies are presented in Section III, and Section 
IV summarizes conclusions. 
II. PRIVACY-PRESERVING ED APPROACH 
A. Original ED Problem 
The original ED problem is formulated as (1)-(6). The 
objective (1) is to maximize the social welfare. (2)-(3) 
represents capacity limits and ramp up/down constraints of 
individual generators. (4) defines limits for individual loads. (5) 
enforces transmission line capacity limits. (6) represents the 
nodal power balance for the DC power flow calculation. 
Locational marginal prices (LMPs) are determined via dual 
variables of constraint (6).  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (−∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑐𝑢𝑘 ∙ 𝑃𝑢𝑘𝑡𝑘𝑢𝑡 + ∑ ∑ ∑ 𝑑𝑣𝑘 ∙ 𝐷𝑣𝑘𝑡𝑘𝑣𝑡 )   (1) 
𝑃𝑢𝑘 ≤ 𝑃𝑢𝑘𝑡 ≤ ?̅?𝑘                                                   (2) 
𝑃𝑢
𝑑𝑛 ≤ ∑ 𝑃𝑢𝑘𝑡𝑘 − ∑ 𝑃𝑢𝑘(𝑡−1)𝑘 ≤ 𝑃𝑢
𝑢𝑝                 (3) 
𝐷𝑣𝑘 ≤ 𝐷𝑣𝑘𝑡 ≤ ?̅?𝑣𝑘                                                   (4) 
−𝑃𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑙 ≤ (𝜃𝑎𝑡 − 𝜃𝑏𝑡) 𝑥𝑎𝑏⁄ ≤ 𝑃𝐿̅̅̅̅ 𝑙                         (5) 
∑ ∑ 𝑃𝑢𝑘𝑡𝑘𝑢∈𝑏 − ∑ ∑ 𝐷𝑣𝑘𝑡𝑘𝑣∈𝑏 = 𝐁𝑏 ∙ 𝛉𝑡                 (6) 
In order to solve the ED problem (1)-(6) in a centralized way, 
all information from GENCOs and LSEs are to be sent to the 
ISO/RTO. Such information includes bidding price 𝑐𝑢𝑘  and 
physical parameters 𝑃𝑢𝑘 , ?̅?𝑢𝑘 , 𝑃𝑢
𝑑𝑛 , and 𝑃𝑢
𝑢𝑝
 of individual 
generators, as well as bidding price 𝑑𝑣𝑘 and physical parameters 
𝐷𝑣𝑘 and ?̅?𝑣𝑘 of individual loads. Transmitting such information 
to ISOs/RTOs and storing them at the ISO/RTO side may be 
risky to information leakage. Moreover, if the ISO adopts could 
computing for the ED problem, additional security concerns 
regarding the critical energy infrastructure information leakage, 
including 𝑥𝑎𝑏 , 𝑃𝐿̅̅̅̅ , and 𝐁𝑏, may raise. 
B. Privacy-Preserving Linear Programming (LP) Problem 
Two privacy-preserving transformation approaches for the 
LP problem have been investigated in literature [15]-[16], in 
which certain information owned by individual entities is 
encrypted via the random matrix transformation before being 
disclosed. After solving the transformed LP problem, each 
entity can decode the corresponding solution components and 
derive the exact solution of the original LP problem. Without 
loss of generality, the LP problem (7)-(8) is used for the ease of 
discussion in this subsection. Assuming that boundaries of 
variables are included in the constraint set (8). 
𝑚𝑖𝑛  [𝑐11 𝑐12  𝑐21  𝑐22  𝑐31  𝑐32] ∙ [𝑥11  𝑥12  𝑥21  𝑥22  𝑥31  𝑥32]′
 (7) 
 3 
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑎11   𝑎12
𝑎13   𝑎14
0         0
0         0
𝑎15   𝑎16
𝑎17    𝑎18
    
0         0
0         0
𝑎21   𝑎22
𝑎23   𝑎24
𝑎25   𝑎26
𝑎27   𝑎28
   
0         0
0         0
0         0
0         0
𝑎31   𝑎32
𝑎33   𝑎34]
 
 
 
 
 
∙
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑥11
𝑥12
𝑥21
𝑥22
𝑥31
𝑥32]
 
 
 
 
 
    
= 𝑏11
≤ 𝑏12
= 𝑏21
≤ 𝑏22
= 𝑏31
≤ 𝑏32
 (8) 
B.1. Vertically Partitioned LP Problem 
For the LP problem (7)-(8), assuming 𝑐11, 𝑐12, and 𝑎11-𝑎18 
are owned by Entity I, 𝑐21 , 𝑐22 , and 𝑎21 -𝑎28  are owned by 
Entity II, and 𝑐31 , 𝑐32 , and 𝑎31-𝑎34  are owned by Entity III. 
Each entity is unwilling to make the corresponding data public 
to avoid potential private information leakage. This is called a 
vertically partitioned LP problem, as parameters in each column 
of the objective and constraints may be owned by different 
entities. 
Entities I-III can generate 2x2 random vectors 𝒀1, 𝒀2, and 𝒀3, 
respectively. Here, “2” represents the number of variables 
owned by each entity. That is, 𝒀𝑖 = [
𝑦𝑖1 𝑦𝑖3
𝑦𝑖2 𝑦𝑖4
] for 𝑖 = 1,2,3 . 
Thus, instead of disclosing 𝑐11 , 𝑐12 , and 𝑎11 -𝑎18 , Entity I 
provides [𝑐11  𝑐12] ∙ 𝒀1  and [
𝑎11 𝑎13 0 0 𝑎15 𝑎17
𝑎12 𝑎14 0 0 𝑎16 𝑎18
]
′
∙ 𝒀1 . 
Similarly, Entity II provides [𝑐21  𝑐22] ∙ 𝒀2  and 
[
0 0 𝑎21 𝑎23 𝑎25 𝑎27
0 0 𝑎22 𝑎24 𝑎26 𝑎28
]
′
∙ 𝒀2  instead of 𝑐21 , 𝑐22 , and 
𝑎21 - 𝑎28 , and Entity III provides [𝑐31  𝑐32] ∙ 𝒀3  and 
[
0 0 0 0 𝑎31 𝑎33
0 0 0 0 𝑎32 𝑎34
]
′
∙ 𝒀3 instead of 𝑐31, 𝑐32, and 𝑎31-𝑎34.  
With the encrypted information, the original LP problem 
(7)-(8) is formulated as a transformed LP problem (9)-(10). 
 𝑚𝑖𝑛      [𝑐11 𝑐12  𝑐21  𝑐22  𝑐31  𝑐32] ∙ [
𝒀1 0 0
0 𝒀2 0
0 0 𝒀3
] ∙
                                              [?̃?11  ?̃?12  ?̃?21  ?̃?22  ?̃?31  ?̃?32]′ (9) 
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑎11 𝑎12 0 0 0 0
𝑎13 𝑎14 0 0 0 0
0 0 𝑎21 𝑎22 0 0
0 0 𝑎23 𝑎24 0 0
𝑎15 𝑎16 𝑎25 𝑎26 𝑎31 𝑎32
𝑎17 𝑎18 𝑎27 𝑎28 𝑎33 𝑎34]
 
 
 
 
 
∙ [
𝒀1 0 0
0 𝒀2 0
0 0 𝒀3
] ∙
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
?̃?11
?̃?12
?̃?21
?̃?22
?̃?31
?̃?32]
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
= 𝑏11
≤ 𝑏12
= 𝑏21
≤ 𝑏22
= 𝑏31
≤ 𝑏32
 (10) 
Comparing (7)-(8) with (9)-(10), it is clear that the extrema 
are equal. In addition, with the optimal solution 
[?̃?11  ?̃?12  ?̃?21  ?̃?22  ?̃?31  ?̃?32]  of the transformed LP problem 
(9)-(10), the optimal solution to the original problem (7)-(8) can 
be retrieved via [𝑥11  𝑥12]′ = 𝒀1 ∙ [?̃?11  ?̃?12]′, [𝑥21  𝑥22 ]′ = 𝒀2 ∙
[ ?̃?21  ?̃?22]′ , and [𝑥31  𝑥32]′ = 𝒀3 ∙ [?̃?31  ?̃?32]′  by the three 
entities individually. 
B.2 Horizontally Partitioned LP Problem 
For the LP problem (7)-(8), assuming 𝑎11-𝑎14  and 𝑏11-𝑏12 
are owned by Entity I, 𝑎21-𝑎24 and 𝑏21-𝑏22 are owned by Entity 
II, while 𝑎15-𝑎18, 𝑎25-𝑎28, 𝑎31-𝑎34, and 𝑏31-𝑏32 are owned by 
Entity III. Each entity is unwilling to disclose the corresponding 
data. This is called a horizontally partitioned LP problem, as 
parameters in each row of constraints may be owned by 
different entities. 
First, by enlarging the dimension of variables with additional 
slack variables 𝑠1 , 𝑠2 , and𝑠3 , Entities I-III can equivalently 
transfer their corresponding inequality constraints into 
equalities. Thus, the original LP problem (7)-(8) is transformed 
into an equivalent LP problem (11)-(13). Note that coefficients 
of slack variables 𝑟1,  𝑟2, and 𝑟3 in constraint (12) can be any 
random positive numbers to make (12) valid.  
𝑚𝑖𝑛  [𝑐11 𝑐12  0  𝑐21  𝑐22  0  𝑐31  𝑐32  0] ∙
                                [𝑥11  𝑥12  𝑠1  𝑥21  𝑥22  𝑠2  𝑥31  𝑥32  𝑠3]′ (11) 
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑎11 𝑎12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝑎13 𝑎14 𝑟1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 𝑎21 𝑎22 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 𝑎23 𝑎24 𝑟2 0 0 0
𝑎15 𝑎16 0 𝑎25 𝑎26 0 𝑎31 𝑎32 0
𝑎17 𝑎18 0 𝑎27 𝑎28 0 𝑎33 𝑎34 𝑟3]
 
 
 
 
 
∙
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑥11
𝑥12
𝑠1
𝑥21
𝑥22
𝑠2
𝑥31
𝑥32
𝑠3 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
= 𝑏11
= 𝑏12
= 𝑏21
= 𝑏22
= 𝑏31
= 𝑏32
 (12) 
𝑠1, 𝑠2 , 𝑠3 ≥ 0 (13) 
Entities I-III can generate 2x2 random matrices 𝑿1, 𝑿2, and 
𝑿3, respectively. Here “2” represents the number of constraints 
owned by each entity. That is, 𝑿𝑖 = [
𝑥𝑖1  𝑥𝑖2 
𝑥𝑖3  𝑥𝑖4 
]  for 𝑖 = 1,2,3 . 
Thus, instead of disclosing 𝑎11-𝑎14 and 𝑏11-𝑏12, Entity I will 
provide 𝑿1 ∙ [
𝑏11
𝑏12
]  and 𝑿1 ∙ [
𝑎11  𝛼12  0  0  0  0  0  0  0
𝑎13  𝛼14  𝑟1  0  0  0  0  0  0
] . 
Similarly, Entity II will provide 𝑿2 ∙ [
𝑏21
𝑏22
]  and 𝑿2 ∙
[
0  0  0  𝑎21  𝛼22  0  0  0  0
0  0  0  𝑎23  𝛼24  𝑟2  0  0  0
], instead of 𝑎21 -𝑎24  and 𝑏21 -𝑏22 , 
while Entity III will provide 𝑿3 ∙ [
𝑏31
𝑏32
]  and 𝑿3 ∙
[
𝑎15  𝛼16  0  𝑎25  𝛼26  0  𝑎31  𝛼32  0
𝑎17  𝛼18  0  𝑎27  𝛼28  0  𝑎33  𝛼34  𝑟3
] , instead of 𝑎15 - 𝑎18 , 
𝑎25-𝑎28, 𝑎31-𝑎34, and 𝑏31-𝑏32 .  
With the encrypted information, the original LP problem can 
be formulated as (14)-(16).  
𝑚𝑖𝑛  [𝑐11 𝑐12  0  𝑐21  𝑐22  0  𝑐31  𝑐32  0] ∙
                  [𝑥11  𝑥12  𝑠1  𝑥21  𝑥22  𝑠2  𝑥31  𝑥32  𝑠3]′ (14) 
[
𝑿1 0 0
0 𝑿2 0
0 0 𝑿3
] ∙  
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑎11 𝑎12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
𝑎13 𝑎14 𝑟1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 𝑎21 𝑎22 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 𝑎23 𝑎24 𝑟2 0 0 0
𝑎15 𝑎16 0 𝑎25 𝑎26 0 𝑎31 𝑎32 0
𝑎17 𝑎18 0 𝑎27 𝑎28 0 𝑎33 𝑎34 𝑟3]
 
 
 
 
 
∙
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑥11
𝑥12
𝑠1
𝑥21
𝑥22
𝑠2
𝑥31
𝑥32
𝑠3 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
                   [
𝑿1 0 0
0 𝑿2 0
0 0 𝑿3
] ∙ [𝑏11 𝑏12 𝑏21 𝑏22 𝑏31 𝑏32]′ (15) 
𝑠1, 𝑠2 , 𝑠3 ≥ 0 (16) 
Comparing (7)-(8) with (14)-(16), it is clear that the extrema 
are equal, and the optimal solution to the original LP problem 
(7)-(8) is the same as that of transformed problem (14)-(16). 
C. Privacy Preserving ED Problem 
The ED problem (1)-(6) can be written in the matrix form 
(17)-(19).  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 [−𝐜1  ⋯− 𝐜𝐺     𝐝1  ⋯ 𝐝𝐷   𝟎] ∙
                                         [𝐏1  ⋯ 𝐏𝐺      𝐃1  ⋯ 𝐃𝐷     𝛉 ]
′ (17) 
 4 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐄1 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎
⋱ ⋱ ⋮
𝟎 ⋯ 𝐄𝐺 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝐅1 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎
⋱ ⋱ ⋮
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝐅𝐷 𝟎
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝐆 ∙ 𝐊𝐋
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 −𝐆 ∙ 𝐊𝐋]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∙
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐏1
⋮
𝐏𝐺
𝐃1
⋮
𝐃𝐷
𝛉 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
≤
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐌1
⋮
𝐌𝐺
𝐍1
⋮
𝐍𝐷
𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅
𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅  ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (18) 
[𝐊𝐏1  ⋯ 𝐊𝐏𝐺     −𝐊𝐃1  ⋯ −𝐊𝐃𝐷     − 𝐁] ∙
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐏1
⋮
𝐏𝐺
𝐃1
⋮
𝐃𝐷
𝛉 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
= 𝟎 (19) 
In the ED problem (17)-(19), each GENCO i owns 𝐜𝑖, 𝐄𝑖, 𝐌𝑖 , 
and 𝐊𝐏𝑖 with decision variables 𝐏𝑖, each LSE j owns 𝐝𝑗, 𝐅𝑗, 𝐍𝑗, 
and 𝐊𝐃𝑗 with decision variables 𝐃𝑗, and the ISO owns (𝐆 ∙ 𝐊𝐋), 
𝐁, and  𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅  with decision variables 𝛉. Thus, the hybrid vertical 
and horizontal partition is applied to achieve the 
privacy-preserving ED model. 
1: Apply the Vertical Partition on the Original ED Problem 
(17)-(19). 
1.1 Each GENCO i provides its encrypted matrices (𝐄𝑖 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝑖), 
(𝐊𝐏𝑖 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝑖), and (𝐜𝑖 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝑖), by generating its own 𝑛𝑖 × 𝑛𝑖 
random positive matrix 𝐘𝐆𝑖 . Each LSE j provides its 
encrypted matrices (𝐅𝑗 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝑗) , (𝐊𝐃𝑗 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝑗) , and (𝐝𝑗 ∙
𝐘𝐃𝑗) , by generating its own 𝑛𝑗 × 𝑛𝑗  random positive 
matrix 𝐘𝐃𝑗 . The ISO provides its encrypted matrices 
(𝐆 ∙ 𝐊𝐋 ∙ 𝐘𝜃)  and (𝐁 ∙ 𝐘𝜃) , by generating its own (𝑇 ∙
(𝐵 − 1)) × (𝑇 ∙ (𝐵 − 1)) random positive matrix 𝐘𝜃. 
1.2 With all information provided in 1.1, the transformed ED 
problem can be formulated as (20)-(22), which is a vertical 
partition privacy-preserving formulation of (17)-(19). That 
is, cost coefficients and left-hand-side coefficients of all 
constraints are encrypted via random numbers privately 
owned by individual entities. 
max    [(−𝐜1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1) ⋯ (−𝐜𝐺 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝐺) (𝐝1 ∙ 𝐘𝐃1) ⋯  
                      (𝐝𝐷 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝐷) 𝟎]  ∙ [?̃?1  ⋯ ?̃?𝐺    ?̃?1  ⋯ ?̃?𝐷  ?̃?]′ (20) 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐄1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎
⋱ ⋱ ⋮
𝟎 ⋯𝐄𝐺 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝐺 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝐅1 ∙ 𝐘𝐃1⋯ 𝟎 𝟎
⋱ ⋱ ⋮
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯𝐅𝐷 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝐷 𝟎
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝐆 ∙ 𝐊𝐋 ∙ 𝐘𝜃
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 −𝐆 ∙ 𝐊𝐋 ∙ 𝐘𝜃]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
∙
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
?̃?1
⋮
?̃?𝐺
?̃?1
⋮
?̃?𝐷
?̃? ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
≤
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐌1
⋮
𝐌𝐺
𝐍1
⋮
𝐍𝐷
𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅
𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅  ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (21)
[(𝐊𝐏1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1) ⋯ (𝐊𝐏𝐺 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝐺) −(𝐊𝐃1 ∙ 𝐘𝐃1) ⋯ −(𝐊𝐃𝐷 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝐷) 
                       −𝐁 ∙ 𝐘𝜃]  ∙ [?̃?1 ⋯ ?̃?𝐺 ?̃?1 ⋯ ?̃?𝐷 ?̃?]′ = 𝟎 (22) 
2: Apply the Horizontal Partition on the Transformed ED 
Problem (20)-(22). 
2.1 Each GENCO i introduces 𝑚𝑖  slack variables 𝒔?̃?𝑖  to 
convert its 𝑚𝑖  inequality constraints into equality, then 
provides its encrypted matrices (𝐗𝐆𝑖 ∙ 𝐄𝑖 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝑖) , (𝐗𝐆𝑖 ∙
𝐑𝐆𝑖), and (𝐗𝐆𝑖 ∙ 𝐌𝑖), by generating one 𝑚𝑖 × 𝑚𝑖 random 
matrix 𝐗𝐆𝑖  and one 𝑚𝑖 × 𝑚𝑖  random positive diagonal 
matrix 𝐑𝐆𝑖. Each LSE j introduces 𝑚𝑗 slack variables 𝒔?̃?𝑗 
to convert its 𝑚𝑗 inequality constraints into equality, then 
provides its encrypted matrices (𝐗𝐃𝑗 ∙ 𝐅𝑗 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝑗) , (𝐗𝐃𝑗 ∙
𝐑𝐃𝑗), and (𝐗𝐃𝑗 ∙ 𝐍𝑗), by generating one 𝑚𝑗 × 𝑚𝑗 random 
matrix 𝐗𝐃𝑗  and one 𝑚𝑗 × 𝑚𝑗  random positive diagonal 
matrix 𝐑𝐃𝑗 . The ISO introduces (2𝑇 ∙ 𝐿) slack variables 
𝒔?̃?1  and 𝒔?̃?2  to convert its (2𝑇 ∙ 𝐿) inequality constraints 
into equality, and provides its encrypted matrices (𝐗𝑙1 ∙ 𝐆 ∙
𝐊𝐋 ∙ 𝐘𝜃) , (𝐗𝑙2 ∙ 𝐆 ∙ 𝐊𝐋 ∙ 𝐘𝜃) , (𝐗𝑙1 ∙ 𝐑𝑙1) , (𝐗𝑙2 ∙ 𝐑𝑙2) , 
(𝐗𝑙1 ∙ 𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅ ) , and (𝐗𝑙2 ∙ 𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅ ) , as well as further encrypted 
matrices (𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐊𝐏𝑖 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝑖) , (𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐊𝐃𝑗 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝑗) , and 
(𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐁 ∙ 𝐘𝜃), by generating two (𝑇 ∙ 𝐿) × (𝑇 ∙ 𝐿) random 
positive matrices 𝐗𝑙1  and 𝐗𝑙2 , one (𝑇 ∙ 𝐵) × (𝑇 ∙ 𝐵) 
random positive matrix 𝐗𝑏 , and two (𝑇 ∙ 𝐿) × (𝑇 ∙ 𝐿) 
random positive diagonal matrices 𝐑𝑙1  and 𝐑𝑙2.  
2.2 With all information provided in 2.1, the transformed ED 
problem can be formulated as (23)-(25), which is a 
horizontal partition privacy-preserving formulation of 
(20)-(22). That is, coefficients and right-hand-sides of all 
constraints are further encrypted via random numbers. Note 
that when converting an inequality constraint into equality, 
adding a non-negative slack variable or the product of a 
positive random number and the non-negative slack 
variable are mathematically equivalent. Thus,  𝐑𝐆𝑖 , 𝐑𝐃𝑗 , 
𝐑𝑙1 , and 𝐑𝑙2 are used to further encrypt each constraint set. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥[(−𝐜1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1)⋯ (−𝐜𝐺 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝐺) (𝐝1 ∙ 𝐘𝐃1)⋯ (𝐝𝐷 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝐷) 𝟎] ∙ 
[?̃?1  ⋯ ?̃?𝐺   ?̃?1  ⋯ ?̃?𝐷  ?̃?   𝒔?̃?1  ⋯ 𝒔?̃?𝐺   𝐬?̃?1  ⋯ 𝐬?̃?𝐷  𝒔?̃?1  𝒔?̃?2]′
 (23) 
𝒔?̃?1, ⋯ , 𝒔?̃?𝐺 , 𝐬?̃?1, ⋯ , 𝐬?̃?𝐷, 𝒔?̃?1, 𝒔?̃?2 ≥ 0 (25) 
3: Solve the Transformed Problem (23)-(25) and Reconstruct 
the Optimal Solution to the Original ED Problem (17)-(19). 
3.1 Solve the transformed ED problem (23)-(25). Its optimal 
solution is [?̃?1
∗  ⋯ ?̃?𝐺
∗    ?̃?1
∗  ⋯ ?̃?𝐷
∗   ?̃?∗   𝒔?̃?1
∗  ⋯ 𝒔?̃?𝐺
∗  𝒔?̃?1
∗ ⋯  
𝒔?̃?𝐷
∗   𝒔?̃?1
∗   𝒔?̃?𝟐
∗ ]  and dual variable solution is 
[?̃?1
∗  ⋯ ?̃?G
∗    ?̃?1
∗  ⋯ ?̃?D
∗    ?̃?1
∗    ?̃?2
∗    ?̃?∗], where ?̃?𝑖
∗ is an𝑚𝑖 × 1 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐄1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐑𝐆1 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 𝟎
⋱ ⋱ ⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
𝟎 ⋯ 𝐗𝐆𝐺 ∙ 𝐄𝐺 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝐺 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯𝐗𝐆𝐺 ∙ 𝐑𝐆𝐺 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 𝟎
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝐗𝐃1 ∙ 𝐅1 ∙ 𝐘𝐃1 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝐗𝐃1 ∙ 𝐑𝐃1 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 𝟎
⋱ ⋱ ⋮ ⋱ ⋱ ⋮ ⋮
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝐗𝐃𝐷 ∙ 𝐅𝐷 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝐷 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝐗𝐃𝐷 ∙ 𝐑𝐃𝐷 𝟎 𝟎
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝐗𝑙1 ∙ 𝐆 ∙ 𝐊𝐋 ∙ 𝐘𝜃 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝐗𝑙1 ∙ 𝐑𝑙1 𝟎
𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 −𝐗𝑙2 ∙ 𝐊𝐋 ∙ 𝐆 ∙ 𝐘𝜃 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 𝐗𝑙2 ∙ 𝐑𝑙2
𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐊𝐏1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1 ⋯ 𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐊𝐏𝐺 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝐺 −𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐊𝐃1 ∙ 𝐘𝐃1 ⋯−𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐊𝐃𝐷 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝐷 −𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐁 ∙ 𝐘𝜃 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 ⋯ 𝟎 𝟎 𝟎 ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[?̃?1  ⋯ ?̃?𝐺    ?̃?1  ⋯ ?̃?𝐷  ?̃?   𝒔?̃?1  ⋯ 𝒔?̃?𝐺    𝐬?̃?1  ⋯ 𝐬?̃?𝐷  𝒔?̃?1  𝒔?̃?2]
′
= [(𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐌1) ⋯ (𝐗𝐆𝐺 ∙ 𝐌𝐺) (𝐗𝐃1 ∙ 𝐍1) (𝐗𝐃𝐷 ∙ 𝐍𝐷) (𝐗𝑙1 ∙ 𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅ ) (𝐗𝑙2 ∙ 𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅ ) 𝟎]
′ (24) 
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vector, ?̃?𝑗
∗  is an 𝑚𝑗 × 1 vector, ?̃?1
∗  and ?̃?2
∗  are (𝑇 ∙ 𝐿)  × 1 
vectors, and ?̃?∗ is an (𝑇 ∙ 𝐵)  × 1 vector. 
3.2 Each GENCO i calculates its optimal solution via 𝐏𝑖
∗ =
𝐘𝐆𝑖 ∙ ?̃?𝑖
∗ . Each LSE j calculates its optimal solution via 
𝐃𝑗
∗ = 𝐘𝐃𝑗 ∙ ?̃?𝑗
∗. The ISO can calculate the final bus angle 
solution via 𝛉∗ = 𝐘𝜃 ∙ ?̃?
∗. The final LMP can be calculated 
via 𝐋𝐌𝐏∗ = − 𝐗𝑏
′ ∙ ?̃?∗. 
The detailed procedure of the proposed privacy-preserving 
ED approach is described as follows: 
Step 1: Each GENCO i provides its encrypted matrices 
(𝐜𝑖 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝑖), (𝐗𝐆𝑖 ∙ 𝐄𝑖 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝑖), (𝐗𝐆𝑖 ∙ 𝐑𝐆𝑖), and (𝐗𝐆𝑖 ∙ 𝐌𝑖). Each 
LSE j provides its encrypted matrices (𝐝𝑗 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝑗) , (𝐗𝐃𝑗 ∙
𝐅𝑗 ∙ 𝐘𝐃𝑗), (𝐗𝐃𝑗 ∙ 𝐑𝐃𝑗), and (𝐗𝐃𝑗 ∙ 𝐍𝑗).  
Step 2: The ISO provides its encrypted matrices (𝐗𝑙1 ∙ 𝐆 ∙ 𝐊𝐋 ∙
𝐘𝜃), (𝐗𝑙1 ∙ 𝐑𝑙1), (𝐗𝑙2 ∙ 𝐑𝑙2), (𝐗𝑙1 ∙ 𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅ ), and (𝐗𝑙2 ∙ 𝐏𝐋̅̅̅̅ ), as well 
as further encrypted matrices (𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐊𝐏𝑖 ∙ 𝐘𝐆𝑖) , (𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐊𝐃𝑗 ∙
𝐘𝐃𝑗), and (𝐗𝑏𝑙 ∙ 𝐁 ∙ 𝐘𝜃).  
Step 3: The ISO or the third-party solves the transformed 
privacy-preserving ED problem (23)-(25). Its optimal solution 
is [?̃?1
∗  ⋯ ?̃?𝐺
∗  ?̃?1
∗  ⋯ ?̃?𝐷
∗   ?̃?∗ 𝒔?̃?1
∗  ⋯ 𝒔?̃?𝐺
∗  𝒔?̃?1
∗ ⋯ 𝒔?̃?𝐷
∗   𝒔?̃?1
∗  𝒔?̃?𝟐
∗ ] 
and dual variable solution is 
[?̃?1
∗  ⋯ ?̃?G
∗   ?̃?1
∗  ⋯ ?̃?D
∗   ?̃?1
∗    ?̃?2
∗    ?̃?∗]. 
Step 4: The corresponding optimal solution to the transformed 
privacy-preserving ED problem (23)-(25) is sent back to 
individual GENCOs and LSEs to reconstruct the optimal 
solution to the original ED problem. That is, each GENCO i can 
obtain its optimal generation dispatch 𝐏𝑖
∗ = 𝐘𝐆𝑖 ∙ ?̃?𝑖
∗; each LSE 
j can calculate its optimal load dispatch 𝐃𝑗
∗ = 𝐘𝐃𝑗 ∙ ?̃?𝑗
∗; and the 
ISO can derive the optimal bus angle 𝛉∗ = 𝐘𝜃 ∙ ?̃?
∗ and the final 
LMP 𝐋𝐌𝐏∗ = − 𝐗𝑏
′ ∙ ?̃?∗. 
In sum, the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach 
allows individual GENCOs and LSEs to mask their actual 
bidding information and physical data by multiplying with 
random numbers before submitting to ISOs/RTOs. This could 
avoid potential information leakage on financial data of market 
participants. In addition, the ISO can encrypt physical 
information on the transmission network topology, which 
would avoid potential information leakage on critical energy 
infrastructure, especially when the optimization problem is 
deployed under cloud computing environments. In the next 
section, numerical case studies will validate the effectiveness of 
the proposed approach, along with detailed analyses on its 
computation and communication costs. 
III. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENT 
The proposed privacy-preserving ED approach is tested on a 
3-bus system and the IEEE 118-bus system to evaluate its 
effectiveness on encrypting critical energy infrastructure 
information and financial data of market participants while 
being able to reconstruct the optimal solution to the original ED 
problem. 
A. 3-Bus System 
A 3-bus system is studied for a single hour, which includes 2 
generators, 1 load, and 3 branches. Generator and load data, 
including their three-segment bidding information, are given in 
Table I. Transmission line data are given in Table II. U1 
belongs to GENCO1, GENCO2 owns U2, and LSE1 serves 
load L1. 
TABLE I GENERATOR/LOAD INFORMATION 
Entity Unit/Load Bus 
Bidding Price 
($/MWh) 
Min Capacity 
(MW) 
Max Capacity 
(MW) 
GENCO1 U1 1 
10 10 90 
15 0 90 
18 0 90 
GENCO2 U2 2 
12 10 80 
18 0 80 
20 0 80 
LSE1 L1 3 
19 100 150 
16 0 50 
14 0 50 
TABLE II TRANSMISSION INFORMATION 
Line From To x (p.u.) Capacity (MW) 
1 1 2 0.1 30 
2 2 3 0.1 150 
3 1 3 0.1 100 
The single hour ED problem is formulated as (26), with bus 1 
as the reference bus. The optimal solution of (26) is 110MW, 
80MW, and 190MW for the two generators and the load. Bus 
angles of buses 2 and 3 and -1p.u. and -10p.u. Power flows on 
the three lines are 10MW, 90MW, and 100 MW. LMPs are 
15$/MWh, 15.5$/MWh, and 16$/MWh for the three buses.  
𝑚𝑎𝑥 (−10𝑃11 − 15𝑃12 − 18𝑃13 − 12𝑃21 − 18𝑃22 − 20𝑃23
+ 19𝐷11 + 16𝐷12 + 14𝐷32) 
10 ≤ 𝑃11 ≤ 90,      0 ≤ 𝑃12 ≤ 90,      0 ≤ 𝑃13 ≤ 90    
10 ≤ 𝑃21 ≤ 80,      0 ≤ 𝑃22 ≤ 80,      0 ≤ 𝑃23 ≤ 80    
100 ≤ 𝐷11 ≤ 150,     0 ≤ 𝐷12 ≤ 50,     0 ≤ 𝐷13 ≤ 50    
−30 ≤ (0 − 𝜃2) 0.1⁄ ≤ 30 
−150 ≤ (𝜃2 − 𝜃3) 0.1⁄ ≤ 150 
−100 ≤ (0 − 𝜃3) 0.1⁄ ≤ 100 
𝑃11 + 𝑃12 + 𝑃13 + 10𝜃2 + 10𝜃3 = 0 
𝑃21 + 𝑃22 + 𝑃23 − 20𝜃2 + 10𝜃3 = 0 
−𝐷11 − 𝐷12 − 𝐷13 + 10𝜃2 − 20𝜃3 = 0 (26) 
The proposed privacy-preserving ED formulation 
corresponding to (23)-(25) is shown in (27)-(28). Six slack 
variables are introduced to each GENCO/LSE for converting 
inequalities constraints into equalities, and six slack variables 
are introduced to convert power flow inequality constraints into 
equalities. The optimal solutions to (27)-(28) include 74.65, 
-58.16, 69.40, 163.25, -98.31, 37.91, 40.08, 401.18, and -99.44 
for the nine masked variables of the two generators and the 
load, 33.03 and -47.84 for the two masked variables of bus 
angles, as well as 0, 800, 500, 125, 101.12, 0, 0, 111.11, 888.89, 
0, 160, 0, 0, 116.28, 15.15, 363.64, 68.49, 0, 74.07, 250, 0, 
181.82, 300, and 204.08 for the 24 masked slack variables. The 
optimal solutions to dual variables of the 27 constraints in 
(27)-(28) are 3.46, -6.59, -1.84, -0.37, -1.29, 10.31, 141.47, 
-173.32, 57, 171.17, 78.35, -234.96, 4.49, -3.90, -0.47, -2.72, 
5.76, -3.49, 0.48, 6.40, -6.15, 0, 0, 0, -13.13, -16.22, and -0.95. 
Sending corresponding solutions back to individual entities, the 
final dispatch and LMP solutions can be derived by individual 
entities via the internal calculation with 𝐘𝐆𝑖, 𝐘𝐃𝑗, 𝐘𝜃, and 𝐗𝑏
𝑇 , 
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respectively. The retrieved final solutions are exactly the same 
as those obtained by the original ED problem (26). For 
instance, GENCO1 can retrieve its dispatch solution of 110MW 
by multiplying its own random matrix 𝐘𝐆1  and the optimal 
solutions of ?̃?11, ?̃?12, and ?̃?13 from (27)-(28) as shown in (29). 
In addition, the final bus angles and LMPs can be retrieved via 
(30)-(31) by the ISO with its own random matrices 𝐘𝜃 and 𝐗𝑏 . 
[
𝑃11
𝑃12
𝑃13
] = 𝐘𝐆1 ∙ [
?̃?11
?̃?12
?̃?13
] = [
0.38 0.05 0.93
0.56 0.53 0.13
0.07 0.77 0.57
] ∙ [
74.65
−58.16
69.40
] = [
90
20
0
] 
(29) 
[
𝜃2
𝜃3
] = 𝐘𝜃 ∙ [
?̃?2
?̃?3
] = [
0.94 0.67
0.32 0.43
] ∙ [
33.03
−47.84
] = [
−1
−10
]  (30) 
[
𝐿𝑀𝑃1
𝐿𝑀𝑃2
𝐿𝑀𝑃3
] = −𝐗𝑏
′ ∙ [
𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑡 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒
 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑖𝑛(25)
] 
      = − [
0.58 0.06 0.92
0.44 0.87 0.22
0.26 0.63 0.37
]
′
∙ [
−13.13
−16.22
−0.95
] = [
15
15.5
16
] (31) 
In order to perform the original ED calculation (26), each 
market participant has to submit its actual financial bidding 
prices and physical information to the ISO. For instance, 
GENCO1 will submit its three-segment bidding prices 
10$/MWh, 15$/MWh, and 18 $/MWh, together with the 
three-segment dispatch ranges [10, 90]MW, [0, 90]MW, and 
[0, 90]MW. In comparison, under the proposed 
privacy-preserving ED approach (27)-(28), GENCO1 will 
provide 𝐜1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1  (32), 𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐄1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1  (33), 𝐊𝐩1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1  (34), 
 𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐑𝐆1 (35), and  𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐌1 (36). In addition, after solving 
(27)-(28), GENCO1 will use the final optimal solution to 
calculate and public its final optimal dispatch via (29). Random 
matrices 𝐗𝐆1 , 𝐘𝐆1 , and 𝐑𝐆1  are only used by GENCO1 for 
internal calculations, but not shared with others.  
We further investigate if inferences may occur in the 
proposed privacy-preserving ED approach. That is, with 
released information on 𝐜1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1 , 𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐄1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1 , 𝐊𝐩1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1 , 
 𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐑𝐆1 , 𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐌1 , and 𝐘𝐆1 ∙ [74.65 −58.16 69.40]′ 
shown in (32)-(37), whether one can reveal actual values of 𝐜1 
and 𝐌1. (34) and (37) provide six linear equations with nine 
random variables of 𝐘𝐆1 . Thus, one cannot retrieve exact 
values of 𝐘𝐆1  and in turn cannot derive actual values of 𝐜1 
from (32). In addition, (33) and (35) provide 66 bi-linear 
equations with 51 random variables from 𝐗𝐆1, 𝐑𝐆1, and 𝐘𝐆1. 
Thus, one cannot retrieve exact values of 𝐗𝐆1  and in turn 
cannot derive actual values of 𝐌1 from (36). Furthermore, the 
first encrypted constraint for GENCO1 is shown in (38), which 
cannot not be used to reveal the actual constraint of 𝑃11 ≤ 90. It 
is clear that by providing (32)-(37), GENCO1 can successfully  
𝑚𝑎𝑥    [−13.46    − 22.31    − 21.51    − 17.16    − 25.84    − 18.44    17.09    14.54    30.45    0    0]             
                                                                                                                                 ∙ [?̃?11  ?̃?12   ?̃?13   ?̃?21   ?̃?22   ?̃?23   ?̃?11   ?̃?12  ?̃?13   ?̃?2   ?̃?3]
′
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝐀𝟏 𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏 𝐀𝟐 𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏 𝐀𝟑
𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏
𝐀𝟒
𝐀𝟓 𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏 𝐀𝟔 𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏 𝐀𝟕
𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏
𝐀𝟖 𝟎𝟏
𝟎𝟏 𝐀𝟗
𝐀𝟏𝟎 𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏 𝟎𝟏]
 
 
 
 
 
∙ [?̃?11 ?̃?12 ?̃?13  ?̃?21 ?̃?22 ?̃?23  ?̃?11  ?̃?12  ?̃?32  ?̃?2   ?̃?3  𝑠?̃?11  𝑠?̃?12  𝑠?̃?13  𝑠?̃?14  𝑠?̃?15  𝑠?̃?16 𝑠?̃?21 
𝑠?̃?22 𝑠?̃?23 𝑠?̃?24 𝑠?̃?25 𝑠?̃?26 𝑠?̃?11 𝑠?̃?12 𝑠?̃?13 𝑠?̃?14  𝑠?̃?15 𝑠?̃?16  𝑠?̃?11 𝑠?̃?12 𝑠?̃?13  𝑠?̃?21  𝑠?̃?22 𝑠?̃?23]′ = [233 121.7 65 74.8 98.6 69.9 
151.4 86.2 140.1 111.8 166.7 197.4 85.5 156.5 51.5 −17.5 177 105 98.9 195.7 187.1 265.1 205.5 157.7 0 0 0]′  
𝑠?̃?11, 𝑠?̃?12, 𝑠?̃?13, 𝑠?̃?14, 𝑠?̃?15, 𝑠?̃?16, 𝑠?̃?21, 𝑠?̃?22, 𝑠?̃?23, 𝑠?̃?24, 𝑠?̃?25, 𝑠?̃?26, 𝑠?̃?11, 𝑠?̃?12, 𝑠?̃?13, 𝑠?̃?14, 𝑠?̃?15, 𝑠?̃?16, 𝑠?̃?11, 𝑠?̃?12, 𝑠?̃?13, 𝑠?̃?21, 𝑠?̃?22, 𝑠?̃?23 ≥ 0 
 (27) 
𝐀𝟏 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0.77 0.43 0.82
0.16 −0.08 −0.47
−0.02 −0.14 −0.57
−0.54 0.01 −0.44
−0.08 −0.58 −0.42
−0.03 −0.50 −0.46]
 
 
 
 
 
, 𝐀𝟐 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0.28 0.34 0.02
−0.23 −0.39 0.04
0.10 0.02 −0.03
−0.02 0.29 0.24
0.41 0.27 0.79
0.49 0.82 0.42]
 
 
 
 
 
, 𝐀𝟑 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
−0.13 0.03 −0.05
0.15 0.22 0.18
−0.59 −0.06 −0.53
−0.59 −0.35 −0.76
−0.01 0.32 0.16
0.65 0.34 1.06]
 
 
 
 
 
,   𝐀𝟒 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
−6.39 −5.57
−0.61 −3.60
−0.50 −3.13
5.27 7.61
−0.81 2.41
5.81 6.44]
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝐀𝟓 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0.07 0.00 0.14 0.02 0.70 0.81
0.02 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.47 0.93
0.01 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.44
0.01 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.60 0.21
0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.85
0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.79]
 
 
 
 
 
,   𝐀𝟔 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0.47 0.29 0.07 0.01 0.29 0.19
0.04 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.47 0.24
0.55 0.35 0.03 0.02 0.37 0.25
0.05 0.21 0.05 0.04 0.43 0.13
0.71 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.49 0.05
0.65 0.42 0.08 0.01 0.40 0.10]
 
 
 
 
 
, 
𝐀𝟖 = [
0.25 0.10 0.04
0.05 0.16 0.41
0.07 0.17 0.32
] 
𝐀𝟗 = [
0.19 0.77 0.93
0.08 0.75 0.53
0.15 0.37 0.67
] 
𝐀𝟕 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0.59 0.34 0.42 0.04 0.21 0.20
0.69 0.15 0.22 0.06 0.55 0.18
0.40 0.26 0.43 0.03 0.01 0.33
0.08 0.32 0.50 0.07 0.04 0.30
0.63 0.04 0.38 0.05 0.49 0.27
0.26 0.06 0.49 0.02 0.44 0.02]
 
 
 
 
 
, 𝐀𝟏𝟎 = [
0.59 0.78 0.95 0.07 0.08 0.06 −1.08 −0.78 −1.83 9.13 4.09
0.44 0.59 0.72 0.96 1.23 0.90 −0.26 −0.19 −0.44 −7.37 −3.50
0.26 0.35 0.42 0.69 0.89 0.65 −0.43 −0.31 −0.74 −5.44 −3.58
]  
           (28) 
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encrypt its actual financial bidding prices and dispatch ranges 
from being released. Furthermore, it is impossible for other 
entities or third-parties to reveal actual values of 𝐜1  and 𝐌1 
with public information on (32)-(37). 
𝐜1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1 = [𝑐11 𝑐12 𝑐13] ∙ [
𝑌𝐺11 𝑌𝐺12 𝑌𝐺13
𝑌𝐺14 𝑌𝐺15 𝑌𝐺16
𝑌𝐺17 𝑌𝐺18 𝑌𝐺19
] = [
13.46
22.31
21.51
]
′
 (32) 
𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐄1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑋𝐺11 𝑋𝐺12 𝑋𝐺13 𝑋𝐺14 𝑋𝐺15 𝑋𝐺16
𝑋𝐺17 𝑋𝐺18 𝑋𝐺19 𝑋𝐺110 𝑋𝐺111 𝑋𝐺112
𝑋𝐺113 𝑋𝐺114 𝑋𝐺115 𝑋𝐺116 𝑋𝐺117 𝑋𝐺118
𝑋𝐺119 𝑋𝐺120 𝑋𝐺121 𝑋𝐺122 𝑋𝐺123 𝑋𝐺124
𝑋𝐺125 𝑋𝐺126 𝑋𝐺127 𝑋𝐺128 𝑋𝐺129 𝑋𝐺130
𝑋𝐺131 𝑋𝐺132 𝑋𝐺133 𝑋𝐺134 𝑋𝐺135 𝑋𝐺136]
 
 
 
 
 
∙
[
 
 
 
 
 
1 0 0
−1 0 0
0 1 0
0 −1 0
0 0 1
0 0 −1]
 
 
 
 
 
∙ [
𝑌𝐺11 𝑌𝐺12 𝑌𝐺13
𝑌𝐺14 𝑌𝐺15 𝑌𝐺16
𝑌𝐺17 𝑌𝐺18 𝑌𝐺19
] =
[
 
 
 
 
 
0.77 0.43 0.82
0.16 −0.08 −0.47
−0.02 −0.14 −0.57
−0.54 0.01 −0.44
−0.08 −0.58 −0.42
−0.03 −0.50 −0.46]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (33) 
𝐊𝐩1 ∙ 𝐘𝐆1 = [
1 1 1
0 0 0
0 0 0
] ∙ [
𝑌𝐺11 𝑌𝐺12 𝑌𝐺13
𝑌𝐺14 𝑌𝐺15 𝑌𝐺16
𝑌𝐺17 𝑌𝐺18 𝑌𝐺19
] = [
1.01 1.35 1.63
0 0 0
0 0 0
] 
 (34) 
𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐑𝐆1 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑋𝐺11 𝑋𝐺12 𝑋𝐺13 𝑋𝐺14 𝑋𝐺15 𝑋𝐺16
𝑋𝐺17 𝑋𝐺18 𝑋𝐺19 𝑋𝐺110 𝑋𝐺111 𝑋𝐺112
𝑋𝐺113 𝑋𝐺114 𝑋𝐺115 𝑋𝐺116 𝑋𝐺117 𝑋𝐺118
𝑋𝐺119 𝑋𝐺120 𝑋𝐺121 𝑋𝐺122 𝑋𝐺123 𝑋𝐺124
𝑋𝐺125 𝑋𝐺126 𝑋𝐺127 𝑋𝐺128 𝑋𝐺129 𝑋𝐺130
𝑋𝐺131 𝑋𝐺132 𝑋𝐺133 𝑋𝐺134 𝑋𝐺135 𝑋𝐺136]
 
 
 
 
 
∙
                               
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑅𝐺11
𝑅𝐺12
𝑅𝐺13
𝑅𝐺14
𝑅𝐺15
𝑅𝐺16]
 
 
 
 
 
 
=
                              
[
 
 
 
 
 
0.07 0 0.14 0.02 0.70 0.81
0.02 0.06 0.08 0.01 0.47 0.93
0.01 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.10 0.44
0.01 0.08 0.02 0.11 0.60 0.21
0.04 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.16 0.85
0.04 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.12 0.79]
 
 
 
 
 
 (35) 
𝐗𝐆1 ∙ 𝐌1 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 
𝑋𝐺11 𝑋𝐺12 𝑋𝐺13 𝑋𝐺14 𝑋𝐺15 𝑋𝐺16
𝑋𝐺17 𝑋𝐺18 𝑋𝐺19 𝑋𝐺110 𝑋𝐺111 𝑋𝐺112
𝑋𝐺113 𝑋𝐺114 𝑋𝐺115 𝑋𝐺116 𝑋𝐺117 𝑋𝐺118
𝑋𝐺119 𝑋𝐺120 𝑋𝐺121 𝑋𝐺122 𝑋𝐺123 𝑋𝐺124
𝑋𝐺125 𝑋𝐺126 𝑋𝐺127 𝑋𝐺128 𝑋𝐺129 𝑋𝐺130
𝑋𝐺131 𝑋𝐺132 𝑋𝐺133 𝑋𝐺134 𝑋𝐺135 𝑋𝐺136]
 
 
 
 
 
 
∙
[
 
 
 
 
 
𝑀11
𝑀12
𝑀13
𝑀14
𝑀15
𝑀16]
 
 
 
 
 
=
                                     [233 121.7 65 74.8 98.6 69.9]′ (36) 
𝐘𝐆1 [
?̃?11
?̃?12
?̃?13
] = [
𝑌𝐺11 𝑌𝐺12 𝑌𝐺13
𝑌𝐺14 𝑌𝐺15 𝑌𝐺16
𝑌𝐺17 𝑌𝐺18 𝑌𝐺19
] ∙ [
74.65
−58.16
69.40
] = [
90
20
0
] (37) 
0.77?̃?11 + 0.43?̃?12 + 0.82?̃?13 + 0.07𝑠?̃?11 + 0.001𝑠?̃?12 +
0.14𝑠?̃?13 + 0.02𝑠?̃?14 + 0.70𝑠?̃?15 + 0.81𝑠?̃?16 = 233 (38) 
B. The IEEE 118-Bus System 
The IEEE 118-bus system is further tested for 24 hours while 
considering all prevailing ED constraints discussed in Section 
II, for illustrating the effectiveness of the proposed 
privacy-preserving ED approach for larger systems. The system 
includes 54 generating units and 91 loads. The following 5 
cases are studied: 
Case 0: The original ED, in which all entities provide their 
actual information. 
Case 1: The proposed privacy-preserving ED, in which 
each GENCO/LSE owns only one generator/load. 
Cases 2-4: The proposed privacy-preserving ED, in which 
each GENCO/LSE owns 2, 5, and 10 generators/loads, 
respectively. These three cases will illustrate how different 
sizes of GENCOs/LSEs may impact computation and 
communication costs of the proposed privacy-preserving ED. 
 Table III shows problem scales and computational 
performances of all 5 cases. All cases derive the same optimal 
solution of $2.0221*106. The proposed privacy-preserving ED 
models in Cases 1-4 do not increase the total number of 
constraints as compared to Case 0, although inequality 
constraints in Case 0 are converted into equality constraints 
with additional slack variables in Cases 1-4. In turn, numbers of 
variables in Cases 1-4 are much higher than that of Case 0. In 
addition, constraint coefficient matrices in Cases 1-4 are much 
denser than that of Case 0. Furthermore, the larger the number 
of generators/loads each entity owns, the higher the density of 
the constraint coefficient matrix is. The computational 
performance in the last column of Table III shows that 
computing times of Cases 1-4 are at the similar level, which is 
about 12 to 16 times higher than that of Case 0. 
TABLE III COMPUTATIONAL PERFORMANCE OF THE 118-BUS SYSTEM 
Case 
# of  
Variables 
# of 
Inequalities 
# of 
Equalities 
# of 
Nonzeros 
CPU Time 
(s) 
0 11472 24372 5016    75432 0.649 
1 35844 0 29388 1178364 8.266 
2 35844 0 29388 1270164 8.657 
3 35844 0 29388 1538924 8.766 
4 35844 0 29388 1964724 10.594 
As the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach in Cases 
1-4 evolves generating random matrices for encrypting 
financial and physical information, multiple instances of Case 4 
are performed to illustrate how random matrices may impact 
the computational performance. Fig. 1 shows computational 
times of 100 instances of Case 4. The shortest and the longest 
computing times among the 100 instances are 6.375 seconds 
and 13.406 seconds, respectively. The mean computing time of 
the 100 instances is 8.639 seconds, with the standard deviation 
of 1.562 seconds. It shows that the computing time is impacted 
by random matrices, while the computational performance may 
range from 10 to 20 times higher than that of Case 0. 
The proposed privacy-preserving ED approach, by 
submitting encrypted matrices instead of actual financial and 
physical information, may also increase the communication 
cost. Table IV shows communication requirements of the 5 
cases. In comparison, information exchange between entities 
and the ISO in Cases 1-4 is much higher than that of Case 0, and 
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is more significant with a larger number of generators/loads 
owned by each entity. For instance, in Case 0, the number of 
data sent from all entities to ISO (including bidding prices and 
physical limitations) is 24,216, and the number of data sent 
from ISO to all entities (including market clear quantities and 
LMPs) is 11,496. On the other hand, in Case 1, the number of 
data sent from all entities to ISO is increased to 232,536, which 
is about 8.6 times higher than that of Case 0. The last two 
columns of Table IV show the size of exchanged data in all 5 
cases. Fortunately, with a typical 10 Mbps bandwidth 
communication infrastructure [17] between market participants 
and the ISO, all these communication tasks can be done within 
seconds. 
 
Fig. 1 Computational time of 100 instances for Case 4 
TABLE IV COMMUNICATION COST  
Case 
# of Exchanged Data  Size of Exchanged Data (Mb) 
From All Entities to 
ISO 
From ISO to All 
Entities 
From All 
Entities to ISO 
From ISO to 
All Entities 
0 24,216 11,496 0.77 0.37 
1 232,536 11,496 7.44 0.37 
2 431,256 11,496 13.81 0.37 
3 1,013,016 11,496 32.42 0.37 
4 1,934,616 11,496 61.91 0.37 
In sum, the following observations can be made from the 
above case studies: 
1) The proposed privacy-preserving ED approach can retrieve 
the same optimal solution as the original ED approach, while 
avoiding disclosing actual bidding information and physical 
data. 
2) For a same system, when a large number of generators/loads 
is owned by a single entity rather than multiple entities, the 
computational time does not increase noticeably while the 
communication cost would significantly increase. 
3) Although the proposed privacy-preserving ED approach 
requires more computational time and a higher communication 
cost as compared to the original ED model, it is still tolerable 
under the current electricity market practice (i.e., less than 10 
seconds for solving the privacy-preserving ED problem and a 
couple of seconds for the communication). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This paper privacy-preserving ED approach in competitive 
electricity market, in which individual GENCOs and LSEs can 
mask their actual bidding information and physical data by 
multiplying with random numbers before submitting to ISOs/ 
RTOs. This would avoid potential information leakage of 
potential financial data of market participants. In addition, the 
ISO can encrypt physical information on the transmission 
network topology, which would avoid potential information 
leakage on critical energy infrastructure, especially when the 
optimization problem is deployed under cloud computing 
environments. The transformed privacy-preserving ED model 
is still an LP problem, with the same number of total constraints 
and a larger number of variables as compared to the original ED 
problem. The optimal solution to the original ED problem can 
be retrieved from the optimal solution of the proposed 
privacy-preserving ED approach. Numerical case studies show 
that although computation and communication costs of the 
proposed privacy-preserving ED approach are higher than the 
original ED, it is still tolerable under the current electricity 
market practice. The future work will investigate the 
application of the proposed approach on other power systems 
optimization problems such as unit commitment and long-term 
investment planning. 
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